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Rhythm and its Absence  
in Modern Politics and Music  
 
Jonathan White (LSE) 
 
Forthcoming, German Life and Letters  
(Special Issue in Memory of John James White) 
 
 
This piece reflects on the significance of periodic time structures in the institutions of modern 
democracy, drawing inspiration from the theorisation of rhythm in music.  Three features of rhythm 
are discussed using the concepts of temporal integration, coordination and rationalisation.  Each 
helps us understand how the institutionalisation of periodicity has helped underpin the democratic 
principle of legitimate opposition.  As contemporary political developments tend to disrupt such 
rhythms, so legitimate opposition becomes harder to maintain.*  
 
 
Writing in 1960, the German composer Karlheinz Stockhausen observed the following of 
the western musical avant-garde of the mid-twentieth century:  
‘Es sind in den letzten Jahren musikalische Formen komponiert worden, […] 
bei denen man […] keine Entwicklungsrichtung aus dem Gegenwärtigen mit 
Gewißheit voraussagen kann; […] [Formen] in denen nicht rastlos ein jedes 
Jetzt als bloßes Resultat des Voraufgegangenen und als Auftakt zu 
Kommendem, auf das man hofft, angesehn wird, sondern als ein 
Persönliches, Selbständiges, Zentriertes, das für sich bestehn kann; Formen, 
in denen ein Augenblick nicht Stückchen einer Zeitlinie […] sein muß […].’1 
  Amongst the shifts in musical organisation he was describing was the appearance, in the 
work of Webern and others, of structures of rhythm that were highly irregular, 
discontinuous, perhaps even scarcely discernible.  The effect of the disturbance of rhythm 
                                                        
* I warmly thank the journal editors for arranging this special issue and for their input on my own paper.  
A first draft was presented at a workshop on ‘Time in Politics; Politics in Time: Historical and 
Normative Perspectives’ at Princeton University, 29th-30th April 2016.   
1 ‘In recent years musical forms have been composed … in which one cannot from the present predict with 
certainty the direction of development; [… forms] in which each now is regarded not as a mere result of the 
immediately preceding one, or as the prelude to the approaching one that is expected – but rather as 
something personal, autonomous, centred, capable of existing on its own; forms in which an instant need 
not be a segment on a time-line ...’.  Stockhausen 1963, pp.198-9 [author trans.]. 
 2 
was, he suggested, to detach the present moment from the past and future, to produce, as 
he put it, ‘Konzentration auf das Jetzt’.2  
 Stockhausen’s views on periodicity were shared by others involved in the 
experimental music of the time. The French composer Gérard Grisey would later put it as 
follows: ‘Excessive discontinuity focus[es] our attention on the present moment, 
prevent[s] us from taking any kind of retrospective view, and put[s] a mute in our 
memory’.3  Or as the American composer George Rochberg wrote: ‘music [today] no 
longer exists in its former state of anticipation of the future.  It projects itself as a series 
of present moments, holding up to aural perception each spatial image as the self-
sufficient object of perception as it occurs, not as it will realise itself in some future 
event.’4  To challenge the periodicity of music was, it seems, to challenge its experience 
as a unified whole. 
If the disruption of periodic rhythm was intended by modern composers to dis-
embed the present from its after and before, here lies one clue to how we might 
understand the significance of rhythm, both in music and perhaps more widely.  That it 
might be a source of temporal integration is an idea others had earlier explored, including 
the philosopher John Dewey.  In a discussion of the rhythmic form, Dewey observed its 
effect of connecting the experience of moments past and present with the expectation of 
those to come. ‘Each beat,’ he said, ‘in differentiating a part within the whole, adds to the 
force of what went before while creating a suspense that is a demand for something to 
come.’ 5   Through the alternation of contrasting elements, a larger whole emerges.  
Rhythm, he suggested, underpins the capacity to project backwards and forwards, to 
employ both memory and anticipation.  
                                                        
2 ‘Concentration on the now’.  Stockhausen 1963, pp.199 [author trans.]. 
3 Grisey 1987, p.253. 
4 Rochberg 1984, p.132.   
5 Dewey 1958, pp.160ff.  On ‘pre-audibility’: Grisey 1987.   
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Though his observations appeared in a study of aesthetics, Dewey believed the 
object of his description was not just a property of music, literature, or the arts in general.  
‘Rhythm,’ he wrote, ‘is a universal scheme of existence.’6  It ‘holds science and art in 
kinship’,7 bridging the social, aesthetic, and organic.  If we follow the suggestion of 
Caroline Levine, rhythm may be seen as a form – a pattern recurring across a range of 
domains, irreducible to the elements composing it in a given setting.8  At its simplest, 
rhythm is the ordered alternation of contrasting elements.9  Sometimes the intervals of 
recurrence are quite uneven, as may be the case in literature.  In other contexts the pattern 
of alternation is regular, as the term periodicity describes.    
One domain outside the arts where the rhythmic form is central, albeit rarely 
theorised,10 is that of politics.  The institutionalisation of democracy in the modern world 
has widely relied on mechanisms that are periodic in structure to facilitate the 
contestation of power.  To take two familiar examples, electoral rules establish a pattern 
of voting that – if not always evenly spaced – has a clearly cyclical structure.  Timetables 
of assembly guide the proceedings of the legislature, so that debates are held and renewed 
on a regular basis.  Electoral and parliamentary cycles are just two of the ways 
democracy bears a rhythmic structure.  To be sure, the non-periodic has also been part of 
the story, especially in the context of such foundational acts as revolutions and 
constitutions.  Rather than as part of a series, such events are generally construed as one-
off moments, if successful then not to be repeated.11  But for many of the institutions of 
modern democracy, a different temporality is to the fore, a politics of alternation and 
repetition – a politics, in other words, of rhythm. 
                                                        
6 Dewey 1958, p.151. 
7 Ibid. See also Bourdieu 1990, p.75, p.81. 
8 Levine 2014.  Henri Lefebvre proposed adopting rhythm as a basic category of social analysis (Lefebvre 
2004): his notes on ‘rhythmanalysis’ remained very much in sketch form however. 
9 http://www.britannica.com/art/rhythm-music. See also Young and Schuller 1988, pp.14ff.; Hamilton & 
Paddison 2016.   
10 Though see Linz 1998, Schedler & Santiso 1998, Goodin 1998, Thompson 2004; Laux & Rosa 2015. 
11 There is, of course, much more to be said on the temporality of both revolutions and constitutions, but 
this simple contrast will do for our purposes. 
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Indeed, if we ask whether this arrangement has a discernible rationale, it is 
striking that an important aspect is again captured by the notion of temporal integration.  
In the political setting, one of the effects of the institutionalisation of periodicity is to 
establish relations between moments in time such that collectively they form a series.  
Electoral cycles, debating calendars, and recurring set-piece events – Prime Minister’s 
Questions, for example – are all mechanisms establishing links between instances of 
contestation, allowing each to be located in a larger frame.  They serve to integrate the 
political process, in a larger, stable whole or pattern, such that it is visibly more than a 
disparate set of isolated clashes. 
This temporal embedding of the present is crucial for the adversarial dimension of 
democracy.  The state of anticipation, specifically of future opportunities when decision-
making and its justification can be contested, is constitutive of how we typically 
understand political opposition.  It is the prospect of opportunities to criticise, influence, 
or reverse decisions that gives parties reason to develop programmatic alternatives.  It is 
also what motivates the acceptance of undesired decisions – what the political scientists 
call ‘losers’ consent’.12   Periodicity casts the shadow of impermanence on decision-
making:13 it gives reason to pursue alternatives, and to see defeat as something other than 
mere capitulation.  There is a chance to fight another day. 
The institutionalisation of periodicity also integrates in the backward-looking 
direction.  It lends political conflict a discernible past, allowing the conflicts of the 
present to be related to previous encounters.  Institutional cycles provide the conditions 
for comparison and narrativisation: they are resources for political memory.14   Other 
features of democracy bolster the continuity of opposition – ideological traditions, and 
enduring organisations like parties – yet each needs the recurring visibility that 
                                                        
12 E.g. Anderson et al. 2005. 
13 Cf. Palonen 2008, p.39; also Linz 1998. 
14 Cf. Orr 2015, ch. 3, on the phenomenology of electoral experience.   
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institutions on the periodic model provide.  As in other domains, the absence or 
disruption of rhythm in politics serves to detach the present from its larger context, to the 
detriment of democratic practice.  
We may trace further the parallels between musical and political rhythm.  Before 
anyone sought to disrupt the periodicity of modern music so as to isolate each moment in 
time15 – before, that is, the question of temporal integration arose – rhythm in western 
music arguably served a more basic function, that of the coordination of performance.  
Rising attention to periodicity, in the composition of music and especially its notation, 
developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in tandem with an increase in its 
coordinative demands.  Polyphonous works featuring multiple parts, and increasingly 
intended for dancing, encouraged and indeed demanded greater precision in the temporal 
component.16  The use of rhythm to create points of reference was, amongst other things, 
a means to solve a practical problem.  To the extent that it is periodic in structure – i.e. to 
the extent there is regularity in the alternation of elements – rhythm allows expectations 
about the future to form, on the basis of which coordination between agents becomes 
possible.  Periodicity provides the resources for joint action.  
In the institutions of politics, one of the early examples of periodicity can likewise 
be read as contributing to the coordination of action.  The historical origins of the 
parliamentary cycle can be traced to efforts to constrain monarchy in early modern 
Europe.17  The English parliamentarians of the reign of Charles I, faced with a period of 
rule in which no parliament was called – the so-called 11-year tyranny – insisted as part 
of their settlement with the King on a more regularised system in which parliaments 
would be called every three years.  The Triennial Act of 1641 counters, with precise 
stipulations, the uncertainty of open time horizons:  
                                                        
15 Cf. Stockhausen, ‘Momentforme’. 
16 Cf. Latham 2011 (entry on rhythm) on the rise of sophisticated notation systems demanding precision in 
duration. 
17 Cf. Palonen 2008, p.106; Riescher 1994, pp.51ff. 
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‘… For the p[re]vention of the like mischeifs and inconveniences in time to 
Comme.  If no Parliament summoned before the 16th Sept. in the 3rd Year 
after the last Day of the last Sitting, then the Parliament to assemble at 
Westminster in the Manner, and by the Means, and at the Time hereafter 
mentioned.’18   
While this move to give temporal order to the proceedings of state has more than one 
significance – we shall return to it in connection with legitimacy – at its most basic it was 
a way to coordinate opposition.  By establishing a set of periodic rules within which the 
King should operate, parliamentarians moved from being a geographically dispersed set 
of individuals, assembled (or not) on an ad hoc basis, to a potentially coherent collective 
agent. 
The rhythms of modern democracy have not always been as precisely determined 
as those imposed on King Charles.  While some states have adopted fixed electoral cycles 
– the US, Sweden or Germany – others make do with a range within which a vote must 
occur.19  The duration of alternation then varies.  Yet still the rhythmic form provides 
limits to uncertainty 20  and reference-points for planning and budgeting.  It guides 
opposition forces as to when they should concentrate their resources and seek unity; 
equally it creates phases of ‘down-time’, e.g. just after an election, when groups may 
consciously waive the need for unity because an interlude before the next election can be 
expected.  Such phases create opportunities for intra-party debates that, absent the 
rhythmicity of institutions, would have particular risks attached. 
Such reference-points for coordination are important not just for the effectiveness 
of opposition but for its inclusiveness.  Where the timing of contestation is patterned, it is 
less likely to be dominated by the most organised groups, who can afford the permanent 
                                                        
18 ‘An Act for the preventing of inconveniencies happening by the long intermission of Parliaments’, in 
Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l, 1819), pp.54-57. 
19 Orr 2015; Palonen 2008. 
20 Zerubavel 1985, p.12.  Cf. Riescher 1994, p.69. 
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mobilisation that irregular timing demands.  Scholars of US politics have observed that 
voter turnout is higher when elections to different chambers are clustered on a single 
periodic cycle, and lower when these elections are timed irregularly or divided across 
different cycles.21  Periodicity and equality of participation seem linked.      
Note also that it is by making the timing of contestation independent of other 
events in the life of the polity that institutional rhythms help coordinate opinion as 
competing general outlooks, of the kind one associates with party programmes.  Where 
contestation proceeds ad hoc, in response to issues and events as they arise, it will 
generally focus on the particularities of the situation.  For systematic contestation at the 
level of principle, the institutionalisation of periodicity, and thus of an exogenous 
political time-scale, is likely to be a major resource. 
I have spoken of two major contributions of the periodic form – temporal 
integration, and coordination.  There is a third that may be expressed with the term 
rationalisation.  By the grouping and spacing of elements, periodic rhythm creates a 
structure in which each part has its place.  To cite Dewey again in his discussion of 
rhythm: ‘there is a wealth of suggestion in the phrase “takes place”.  The change not only 
comes but it belongs; it has its definite place in a larger whole.’22  More than just an aid 
to coordination and integration, rhythm establishes that each part belongs.  In this way it 
creates expectations that are normative, not just predictive in character.   
Anthropologists have referred to the ‘temporal anchoring of normality’.23  What 
falls within a periodic structure has its legitimate presence undergirded thereby, just as 
what interrupts such a structure takes the form of a provocation.  Where temporal 
regularity is absent, the normative scheme is correspondingly looser.  Again, this is a 
feature of rhythm across its many domains.  Music theorists have spoken of ‘repetition 
                                                        
21 Cf. Anzia 2013, who develops this observation into an argument for synchronising elections. 
22 Dewey 1958, pp.160ff. 
23 Zerubavel 1985, p.20. 
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schemes as a rationalisation of time,’24 and of the rationalising effects of rhythm in the 
work of particular composers.25  The periodic structure evokes, we may say, a rule-bound 
order and an accompanying set of normative expectations. 
This dimension is of special importance for democracy.  By cultivating the 
expectation that political opposition will articulate itself at regular intervals, periodic 
institutions contribute to its normalisation.  They make its expression part of the ordinary 
run of things, something for which space has been reserved.  They contribute to the 
legitimacy of opposition. 
When institutions are organised on a periodic basis, they operate to a timetable 
largely independent not just of specific events but of the will of particular agents.  
Opportunities for contestation arise not because they have been granted, or because an 
agent has had to extract them, but because a largely anonymous process requires it.  The 
precision noted in the Triennial Act of 1641 introduces a measure of automaticity in the 
proceedings of representation. In this way rhythm may be said to anonymise 
responsibility for the timing of dissent.   
This matters because the articulation of opposition usually results in decisions and 
their implementation being delayed.  A parliamentary debate slows down the passage of a 
bill.  Without regular slots set aside for it, dissent is liable to be cast as a blot on the 
efficiency of government.  By marking out a relatively autonomous temporal sphere, 
institutions organised periodically protect the practices of opposition from the intrusion 
of criteria such as efficiency that put their legitimacy in question.  They allow critics to 
alleviate the time pressures they would otherwise be subject to by appealing to something 
standardised.  They allow the de-personalisation of responsibility for delay. 
Another way to say this is that institutionalised rhythms express the autonomy of 
democratic time.  They establish a sequence of events that, while never wholly insulated 
                                                        
24 Barry 1990, p.68.  Cf. Berry 1976/1986, p.305 on rhythm as ‘ordered time’.   
25 Cf. Ingarden 1986, p.96 on Bach. 
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from interference, is irreducible to the preferences of any one group.  They sharpen the 
boundary, always precarious, between political processes and socio-economic interests.  
Integration, coordination and rationalisation – with these categories we can form 
a provisional conclusion.  Just as periodicity has been central to the structure of certain 
art forms, there are good reasons why it has been central to the institutions of democracy.  
To sketch the parallels between music and politics is not to deny there are aspects of the 
rhythmic form which are domain-specific.  To mention just a few: there are aesthetic 
considerations, to do with harmony and unity of form, and the disruption of these 
qualities, that are central to the appreciation of rhythm in music but less so to its 
evaluation in politics. Likewise, there are differences in how rhythm is experienced – in a 
direct, even physical, fashion in music,26 while through an act of imagination over the 
slower timescales of institutions.  No-one – presumably – taps their foot to the electoral 
cycle.  Furthermore, in some contexts rhythms can be contested – they become sites of a 
conflict of power – whereas in others they are taken as given.  Such variations 
notwithstanding, the commonalities across domains are striking. 
If rhythm has been central to the institutions of modern politics, what is its status 
today?  Do we still live in an age in which periodicity supports the practice of 
democracy?  I want to suggest things are moving in a different direction: that certain 
trends disrupt this relation, and for this reason pose a democratic challenge.  Importantly, 
to the extent we see a disruption of periodicity, it is not, I suggest, just a secondary 
feature of a more fundamental process of democratic weakening.  To emphasise the 
temporal structures in play is not just to emphasise an unfamiliar angle on a familiar 
story.  Rather, it is because the institutions being marginalised are periodic that the 
democratic costs may be high.   
                                                        
26 As described by the concept of ‘entrainment’. 
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As one major trend, I have in mind the rise of emergency-led decision-making, in 
which legislation is pursued as a response to urgent threats.  In the economic crisis of the 
last ten years, executive decisions have frequently been taken rapidly and outside the 
timetables of representative politics.  Think of financial transfers to support ailing banks, 
of policies announced on a Monday morning to reassure the markets.27  It is not simply 
that the institutions involved may offer few opportunities to contest these decisions 
(though this may be true, especially of avowedly ‘independent’ institutions such as 
central banks).  It is that, even where contestation is possible, it is often highly a-rhythmic 
in its timing.  Being tightly linked to crisis conditions, such decisions are made quickly 
and are hard to reverse without re-evoking the spectre of crisis.  They present themselves 
as exceptional, one-off decisions. 
The fact that crises tend to cross borders means the rise of emergency-led 
decision-making is typically also the rise of transnational decision-making.  The recent 
economic crisis has largely been handled this way, including through institutions 
associated with the European Union.  Here there is no dominant periodic cycle: the 
timing of decisions in the Council is shaped rather by the constraints of international 
diplomacy.  The European Parliament is too weak to impose its own rhythm, and one 
effect of transnationalisation is to highlight the a-synchrony of rhythms across countries.  
Because national elections in EU states do not occur simultaneously, decisions 
coordinated transnationally fall at different moments in national cycles.  This mismatch 
reinforces cross-cutting boundaries and encourages the fragmentation of dissent.28  It is 
not that the rhythms of national democracy disappear, but they lack structuring capacity 
at the newly relevant transnational level.   
                                                        
27 Cf. White 2014, 2015a, 2015b. 
28 On asynchrony as boundary-reinforcing: Zerubavel 1985, p.67. On the EU’s heterotemporality: Goetz 
2009. 
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Dissent is still raised in these circumstances, but according to a quite different 
temporality.  In the quest to reassert themselves, opposition voices will be tempted to 
detach themselves from the periodic institutions of representative democracy and seek 
expression in non-periodic form.  Street protests are one manifestation.  These typically 
rely on ideas of immediacy.  The name and practices of the ‘Occupy’ movement suggest 
the single encounter maintained indefinitely, not a series of repeated clashes.  Theirs is 
not the temporality of rhythm but that of the attempt to establish continuous presence. 
Referenda are another non-periodic form.  The referendum of July 2015 in Greece 
on the bail-out measures demanded by the country’s creditors is one example.  Calls for 
referenda, and the campaigns once underway, generally involve the idea of politics as a 
one-off.  They invoke, as in the Greek case, the language of the ‘historic opportunity’29 
and the ‘critical juncture’30 – of the moment that comes only once, of actions now or 
never.  The emphasis is on an opportunity to contest that is not to be repeated, at least to a 
foreseeable timetable.  Emergency parliamentary debates follow the same logic. 
These forms of opposition departing from the periodic model have evident appeal 
as ways to challenge executive power under present conditions.  Being weakly 
constrained by the electoral cycle and other institutional rhythms, they are well suited to 
rapid mobilization in response to emergency decisions.  Equally, street protests, strikes 
and the like can be organized cross-nationally exactly because they are separate from the 
non-synchronised cycles of institutions. 
One cannot fail to be impressed by the democratic energy such non-periodic 
actions may unleash.  As well as mobilising people to a particular cause at a particular 
time, they may spill over into more enduring forms of political organisation.  But can 
                                                        
29 Tsipras, 1st July 2015: http://www.primeminister.gov.gr/english/2015/07/01/prime-minister-alexis-
tsipras-message/ 
30 Tsipras, 28th June 2015 http://www.primeminister.gov.gr/english/2015/06/28/prime-minister-alexis-
tsipras-statement-concerning-on-the-latest-developments/  
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they feasibly substitute for institutions on the periodic model?  Our preceding remarks 
suggest reasons to be doubtful.   
First, one suspects the integration of opposition across time suffers where 
periodic institutions are weak.  If political cycles serve to connect present conflicts with 
those of the past and future, the disruption of these rhythms conversely focuses attention 
on the present and detaches it from a larger context.  Empirical studies of transnational 
administrative elites suggest their time horizons are increasingly foreshortened: their 
work becomes a matter of managing the immediate present rather than planning for a 
longer-term future. 31   For political opposition, faced with the additional task of 
communicating its activities to a wider public, the effects of shortened time-horizons are 
likely to be especially severe.  It becomes harder to reveal the stakes of individual 
decisions by locating them in an historical context, and to mobilise supporters by 
cultivating anticipation of the next encounter.   
Then there are the challenges of coordination.  When opportunities for 
contestation occur on an irregular basis, opposition must be ready to mobilise at any 
moment.  It must adopt a stance of permanent vigilance, and find ways to ensure 
participation is not dominated by those most able to maintain this stance.  It must also 
find ways to coordinate at the level of general principle.  Temporally irregular forms of 
mobilisation, be they protests or referendum campaigns, tend to be broad coalitions of 
opinion given unity by their relation to particular issues and decisions.  Not only do they 
therefore form episodes isolated in time, but, lacking a temporal structure that is 
independent of events as they occur, they tend to be reactive and impromptu, bound up in 
the details of the moment.  For the same reason, even where they can adequately contest 
decisions, they are less able to contest the decisions not taken, for which agents must 
abstract from the passage of events. 
                                                        
31 Ekengren 2002. 
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Finally, most importantly, with these irregular forms of contestation there is the 
problem of how to maintain the legitimacy of opposition.  Street protests, referenda and 
citizens initiatives, as well as ad hoc parliamentary debates – the fact they are all un-
timetabled gives the expression of opinion they afford the character of an interruption, of 
an intrusion on the business of governing. For the very reason that they stand outside the 
normal passage of institutional time, they can present themselves as a distraction from 
efficient rule, and their initiators as the instigators of delay.  
What we are seeing then in today’s politics is recourse to forms departing from 
the periodic model, ones democratically less adequate as a result.  Though adopted for 
plausible reason, as ways to contest increasingly irregular styles of executive power, 
these non-periodic modes struggle to give expression to the democratic principle of 
legitimate opposition.  Institutionalising this principle has relied on a certain temporal 
structure: a sequence of alternating elements that provides reference-points for 
coordination, resources to link present with past and future, and opportunities for dissent 
that are embedded in the normal passage of political time.  
The disruption of rhythm in modern – avowedly progressive – music was an 
experiment in dislocating the listener and forcing her back on her own interpretive 
resources.  It involved asserting the singularity of each moment and disrupting its relation 
to what preceded it and would follow, such that the listener would be immersed in the 
present.  Sometime soon, if not already, the modern citizen may find herself in an 
analogous situation, but in the political context the implications seem regressive.  An 
impoverished form of democracy seems the likely outcome.  The question then would be 
whether the periodicity of institutions can be rebuilt, either on the scale of the nation-
state, or, if not, then at some other level.   
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